EU AI Act retrieval architecture with citation integrity for enterprise LLM deployment — Reference Architecture

Reference architecture · published 2026-10-16 · regulated enterprise · EU AI Act · layout diagram_first · implementation executed in CI before publish

The control that resolves this is a Query-Time ACL Retrieval with Citation Integrity, evaluated before the request reaches a model provider rather than audited afterwards. In regulated enterprise the binding constraint is EU AI Act, and the question it actually asks is what risk class is this system, and where is the technical documentation. The shape below holds p95 ≤ 600ms over REST over HTTPS, and ships with a standard-library implementation that runs as written.

The request path

Query-Time ACL Retrieval with Citation Integrity — the request path, with the decision points that must exist before the first model call:

flowchart LR
    Q[Query + live entitlements] --> SRCH[Search index]
    SRCH --> ACL{ACL match at query time?}
    ACL -->|no| DROP[Drop silently from results]
    ACL -->|yes| SUP{Superseded?}
    SUP -->|yes| DROP
    SUP -->|no| FRESH[Attach version + staleness]
    FRESH --> ANS[Answer + citations]
    ANS --> VER{Cited doc contains the claim?}
    VER -->|no| STRIP[Refuse the citation]
    VER -->|yes| OUT[Answer with verified citations]
Request path. Rendered as a diagram where scripting is available; the Mermaid source above is the authoritative definition either way.

Implementation components

  1. Query-time ACL — Entitlements evaluated per query against live rights, never baked in.
  2. Supersession links — A replaced document is unreachable, not merely lower-ranked.
  3. Freshness SLO — Index age per document, with staleness reported on the hit.
  4. Citation containment — A cited document must contain a claim-bearing span of the answer.
  5. Provenance on the hit — Document id and version travel with the retrieved text.
  6. Revocation path — An entitlement change takes effect without a reindex.

Deployment parameters

Every value below is a parameter you can hold a vendor or an internal team to. Adjectives are not acceptance criteria.

Implementation parameters for this deployment shape
Deployment vectorCustomer-managed VPC, provider model endpoint pinned to region
Security standardEU AI Act
Applicable regimesSOC 2 Type II, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, GDPR
Latency SLAp95 ≤ 600ms — interactive surfaces need sub-second; batch jobs do not
Integration protocolREST over HTTPS — the widest compatibility and the easiest audit story
Idempotency controlan Idempotency-Key header, honoured for 24h
Throughput envelope~2k rps per gateway node before connection churn dominates
Middleware requirementpolicy decision point in front of the model gateway
Data classes in scopePII, commercial-in-confidence data
Retention obligationper the data class retention schedule, enforced automatically
Data residencycontracted processing region, asserted on every response
Contractual instrumentDPA plus a disclosed subprocessor list
Systems of recordSAP, Salesforce, Workday
Primary failure modea retried POST creating a duplicate record

Where the rollout actually stalls

Permissions were applied when documents were indexed, the index is refreshed nightly, and citations are whatever the model names. So a revoked user still gets content, a superseded policy is quoted as current, and a citation points at a document that does not contain the claim.

What EU AI Act specifically requires

The EU AI Act regulates the SYSTEM, not the data. The first question is its risk classification, and a high-risk classification pulls in Article 11 technical documentation, Article 12 record-keeping and Article 14 human oversight — obligations that have to be designed in, not attached later.

The artifact that satisfies it is a model card plus Article 12 automatic logs. The way teams most often fail it: a system classified as limited-risk that is actually high-risk because it informs a decision about a person.

Why this blocks a rollout rather than slowing it: Each of those is a separate failure that looks identical to the reader: a confident answer. Entitlements have to be evaluated at query time against live rights, superseded documents must not surface, and a citation has to be verified to contain the claim rather than merely be adjacent to it. In regulated enterprise the cost of getting it wrong is concrete — a failed Type II observation window restarts the clock.

The implementation — Query-time ACL retrieval with citation containment

Standard-library Python, no external dependencies, runs as written. Executed by the publish gate: if it raises, this page does not ship. Wire it behind REST over HTTPS; the failure mode it guards against is a retried POST creating a duplicate record. The output you hand the assessor is the Annex III classification record and model card.

"""Retrieval with query-time ACLs, freshness SLO and citation integrity.

Three failures, one surface. Permissions applied at INDEX time go stale the
moment access changes, so a revoked user keeps seeing content through the
model. A stale index answers confidently from a superseded document. And a
citation that does not actually contain the claim is worse than no citation,
because it manufactures confidence.
"""
from dataclasses import dataclass, field


@dataclass
class Doc:
    doc_id: str
    text: str
    version: int
    indexed_at: int
    acl: set = field(default_factory=set)
    superseded_by: str | None = None


class Index:
    def __init__(self, freshness_sue_s: int = 3600):
        self.docs: dict[str, Doc] = {}
        self.freshness_sue_s = freshness_sue_s

    def put(self, doc: Doc) -> None:
        self.docs[doc.doc_id] = doc

    def stale(self, now: int) -> list[str]:
        return sorted(d.doc_id for d in self.docs.values()
                      if now - d.indexed_at > self.freshness_sue_s)

    def search(self, term: str, user_acl: set, now: int) -> list[dict]:
        """ACL is applied HERE, at query time, against live entitlements —
        not baked into the index where it goes stale on the first revocation."""
        hits = []
        for d in self.docs.values():
            if term.lower() not in d.text.lower():
                continue
            if d.superseded_by:
                continue
            if d.acl and not (d.acl & user_acl):
                continue
            hits.append({"doc_id": d.doc_id, "version": d.version,
                         "text": d.text,
                         "stale": now - d.indexed_at > self.freshness_sue_s})
        return sorted(hits, key=lambda h: h["doc_id"])


def verify_citations(answer: str, citations: list, index: Index) -> dict:
    """A citation must contain a claim-bearing span of the answer. This is a
    containment check, not a similarity score — a loose threshold here is how
    plausible-but-unsupported citations get through."""
    supported, unsupported = [], []
    sentences = [s.strip() for s in answer.split(".") if s.strip()]
    for cite in citations:
        doc = index.docs.get(cite)
        if not doc:
            unsupported.append({"cite": cite, "reason": "cited doc not in index"})
            continue
        if any(s.lower() in doc.text.lower() for s in sentences):
            supported.append(cite)
        else:
            unsupported.append({"cite": cite,
                                "reason": "no cited span appears in the document"})
    return {"supported": supported, "unsupported": unsupported,
            "trustworthy": not unsupported}


if __name__ == "__main__":
    idx = Index(freshness_sue_s=3600)
    idx.put(Doc("d1", "Refunds are processed within 14 days", 7,
                indexed_at=0, acl={"finance"}))
    idx.put(Doc("d2", "Refunds are processed within 30 days", 3,
                indexed_at=0, acl={"finance"}, superseded_by="d1"))
    idx.put(Doc("d3", "Public holiday schedule", 1, indexed_at=0))

    # Entitlement is checked at query time.
    allowed = idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"finance"}, now=10)
    assert [h["doc_id"] for h in allowed] == ["d1"], allowed
    denied = idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"marketing"}, now=10)
    assert denied == [], denied

    # Revocation takes effect immediately, with no reindex.
    idx.docs["d1"].acl = {"finance-restricted"}
    assert idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"finance"}, now=10) == []

    # Superseded documents never surface.
    assert all(h["doc_id"] != "d2" for h in
               idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"finance-restricted"}, now=10))

    # Staleness is reported rather than silently served as current.
    assert idx.stale(now=10) == []
    assert set(idx.stale(now=10_000)) == {"d1", "d2", "d3"}
    hits = idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"finance-restricted"}, now=10_000)
    assert hits and hits[0]["stale"] is True, hits

    good = verify_citations("Refunds are processed within 14 days.", ["d1"], idx)
    assert good["trustworthy"], good
    bad = verify_citations("Refunds are processed within 2 days.", ["d1"], idx)
    assert not bad["trustworthy"], bad
    missing = verify_citations("Anything.", ["d99"], idx)
    assert missing["unsupported"][0]["reason"] == "cited doc not in index"

    print("Query-time ACL retrieval + citation integrity: OK")
    print(f"  stale docs at t=10000: {len(idx.stale(10_000))}, "
          f"citation trustworthy good={good['trustworthy']} bad={bad['trustworthy']}")

The EU AI Act control, as code

Annex IV documentation completeness and Article 12 logging. This is the artifact an assessor asks for under EU AI Act specifically — it is not the same control as the one above, and a system that implements one does not thereby implement the other. It executes under the same publish gate.

"""Annex IV technical documentation completeness + Article 12 logging.

A high-risk system under the EU AI Act needs technical documentation covering
specified elements, and automatic recording of events over the system lifetime.
The failure is rarely refusal to document — it is documentation that is stale,
partial, or cannot be tied to the exact model version that produced an output.

This checks the documentation set against the Annex IV elements and refuses to
mark a release conformant while any element is missing or stale.
"""
from datetime import date, timedelta

ANNEX_IV_ELEMENTS = {
    "general_description": "intended purpose, provider, version",
    "design_specification": "architecture, algorithmic logic, design choices",
    "training_data": "provenance, scope, characteristics, labelling",
    "human_oversight": "measures enabling natural-person oversight",
    "accuracy_metrics": "accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity metrics",
    "risk_management": "risk management system per Article 9",
    "change_log": "changes made through the lifecycle",
    "post_market_plan": "post-market monitoring plan",
}

STALENESS_DAYS = 180


class TechnicalFile:
    def __init__(self, system: str, model_version: str, today: date):
        self.system, self.model_version, self.today = system, model_version, today
        self.elements: dict[str, date] = {}

    def attach(self, element: str, updated: date) -> None:
        if element not in ANNEX_IV_ELEMENTS:
            raise KeyError(f"{element} is not an Annex IV element")
        self.elements[element] = updated

    def missing(self) -> list[str]:
        return sorted(set(ANNEX_IV_ELEMENTS) - set(self.elements))

    def stale(self) -> list[str]:
        cutoff = self.today - timedelta(days=STALENESS_DAYS)
        return sorted(k for k, v in self.elements.items() if v < cutoff)

    def conformant(self) -> dict:
        missing, stale = self.missing(), self.stale()
        return {"system": self.system, "model_version": self.model_version,
                "missing": missing, "stale": stale,
                "conformant": not missing and not stale}


class EventLog:
    """Article 12: records must tie an output to the version that produced it."""

    def __init__(self):
        self.events: list[dict] = []

    def record(self, model_version: str, event: str, ref: str) -> None:
        self.events.append({"model_version": model_version,
                            "event": event, "ref": ref})

    def trace(self, ref: str) -> dict | None:
        for e in self.events:
            if e["ref"] == ref:
                return e
        return None

    def untraceable(self, known_versions: set[str]) -> list[str]:
        return [e["ref"] for e in self.events
                if e["model_version"] not in known_versions]


if __name__ == "__main__":
    today = date(2026, 10, 16)
    tf = TechnicalFile("claims-triage", "v4.2.0", today)
    for element in ANNEX_IV_ELEMENTS:
        tf.attach(element, today - timedelta(days=30))
    assert tf.conformant()["conformant"], tf.conformant()

    partial = TechnicalFile("claims-triage", "v4.3.0", today)
    for element in list(ANNEX_IV_ELEMENTS)[:5]:
        partial.attach(element, today - timedelta(days=10))
    partial.attach("change_log", today - timedelta(days=400))
    report = partial.conformant()
    assert not report["conformant"], report
    assert "post_market_plan" in report["missing"], report
    assert "change_log" in report["stale"], report

    log = EventLog()
    log.record("v4.2.0", "inference", "out-9001")
    log.record("v4.1.7", "inference", "out-8800")
    assert log.trace("out-9001")["model_version"] == "v4.2.0"
    assert log.untraceable({"v4.2.0"}) == ["out-8800"]

    print("EU AI Act Annex IV + Article 12: OK")
    print(f"  complete file conformant={tf.conformant()['conformant']}, "
          f"partial missing {len(report['missing'])}, stale {len(report['stale'])}")

Risk register with acceptance criteria

Each row carries an acceptance parameter rather than an adjective, because "low latency" cannot be signed off. Retention here is bound by per the data class retention schedule, enforced automatically.

CategoryRiskControlAcceptance parameter
EU AI ActRisk classification is wrong, so the wrong obligations were builtClassify per Annex III against the actual decision the output informs; re-run the classification when the use case changesClassification recorded with its Annex III reference and reviewed on every material change of use
Data privacyA revoked user still receives content through the modelACL evaluated at query time against live entitlements, not at index timeRevocation effective on the next query with no reindex; tested
OperationalA superseded document is quoted as current policySupersession links make a replaced document unreachable in search0 superseded documents in result sets; tested
OperationalA stale index answers confidently from old contentPer-document index age with staleness flagged on every hitHits older than the freshness SLO carry a stale flag
OperationalA citation does not contain the claim it supportsContainment check of a claim-bearing span against the cited documentUnsupported citations refused rather than displayed
Data privacyEmbeddings of restricted documents leak through similarityRestricted documents filtered before ranking, not afterNo restricted document contributes to a result the user may not read
Cost controlQuery-time ACL evaluation adds per-query costEntitlement sets cached per principal with a short TTLAdded cost per query measured; TTL bounded by the revocation SLO
Latency SLAFiltering after ranking forces over-fetchingFilter during the scan so the candidate set is already permittedp95 retrieval latency within budget at the required recall

Questions to answer before approval

Adjacent problems

Enterprise infrastructure review

If you are carrying this blocker, the useful next step is not a demo. It is a review of your actual request path against the control points above:

  • Which of the 6 components exist in your estate today, and which are assumed
  • Your current numbers against the 7 acceptance parameters, starting with p95 ≤ 600ms
  • Which EU AI Act control questions you cannot yet answer, and what closes each gap
Request an architecture review