GDPR data governance framework for enterprise LLM deployment — Reference Architecture
Deployment parameters
Every value below is a parameter you can hold a vendor or an internal team to. Adjectives are not acceptance criteria.
| Deployment vector | Multi-region active-active with per-region data planes |
|---|---|
| Security standard | GDPR |
| Applicable regimes | SOC 2 Type II, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, GDPR |
| Latency SLA | p95 ≤ 600ms — interactive surfaces need sub-second; batch jobs do not |
| Integration protocol | gRPC with mTLS — high fan-out internal calls where per-request overhead matters |
| Idempotency control | a request id in metadata plus a server-side claim table |
| Throughput envelope | ~18k rps per node; multiplexing removes the connection ceiling |
| Middleware requirement | policy decision point in front of the model gateway |
| Data classes in scope | PII, commercial-in-confidence data |
| Retention obligation | per the data class retention schedule, enforced automatically |
| Data residency | contracted processing region, asserted on every response |
| Contractual instrument | DPA plus a disclosed subprocessor list |
| Systems of record | SAP, Salesforce, Workday |
| Primary failure mode | a half-open HTTP/2 stream silently dropping the deadline |
The control that resolves this is a Classification-Routed Multi-Cloud Estate, evaluated before the request reaches a model provider rather than audited afterwards. In regulated enterprise the binding constraint is GDPR, and the question it actually asks is what is the lawful basis, and can you actually erase. The shape below holds p95 ≤ 600ms over gRPC with mTLS, and ships with a standard-library implementation that runs as written.
The control gap
Workloads span several providers and regions, and the decision of which model may see which data lives in prompt text, a wiki page, or a developer's judgement. That is not a control, so the governance board cannot approve the estate even though every individual component is defensible.
What GDPR specifically requires
GDPR asks two things an audit log does not answer: under what lawful basis was this processed, and can you erase it on request. Erasure is the harder one — a prompt embedded into a vector index and a fine-tune has propagated beyond the row you deleted.
The artifact that satisfies it is a lineage graph from source record to every derived artifact. The way teams most often fail it: an erasure request that cannot be honoured because the data survives in embeddings, caches and eval sets.
The implementation — Classification-driven routing gate with recorded reasons
Standard-library Python, no external dependencies, runs as written. Executed by the publish gate: if it raises, this page does not ship. Wire it behind gRPC with mTLS; the failure mode it guards against is a half-open HTTP/2 stream silently dropping the deadline. The output you hand the assessor is the data-subject lineage and erasure report.
"""Classification-driven routing gate for a multi-cloud LLM estate.
Why this shape: "which model may see this data" is a governance decision, and
if it lives in prompt text or a developer's judgement it is not a control. It
has to be a deterministic function of the data's classification and the
destination's attested properties, evaluated before egress.
The gate below is the smallest thing that an actual data-governance board will
accept: classification in, allowed destinations out, with a recorded reason for
every allow and every deny.
"""
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
from enum import IntEnum
class Class(IntEnum):
PUBLIC = 0
INTERNAL = 1
CONFIDENTIAL = 2
RESTRICTED = 3 # PII / PHI / material non-public
DETECTORS = {
"email": re.compile(r"[\w.+-]+@[\w-]+\.[\w.]{2,}"),
"iban": re.compile(r"\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{10,30}\b"),
"card": re.compile(r"\b(?:\d[ -]?){13,19}\b"),
"ssn": re.compile(r"\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b"),
"mrn": re.compile(r"\bMRN[:\s-]*\d{6,10}\b", re.I),
}
def luhn(number: str) -> bool:
"""Card detectors without Luhn produce false positives on order numbers,
and a gate that cries wolf gets switched off."""
digits = [int(c) for c in re.sub(r"\D", "", number)]
if len(digits) < 13:
return False
checksum, parity = 0, len(digits) % 2
for i, d in enumerate(digits):
if i % 2 == parity:
d *= 2
if d > 9:
d -= 9
checksum += d
return checksum % 10 == 0
def classify(text: str, floor: Class = Class.INTERNAL) -> tuple:
"""-> (classification, evidence). Deterministic and explainable."""
found = []
for name, rx in DETECTORS.items():
for m in rx.finditer(text or ""):
if name == "card" and not luhn(m.group(0)):
continue
found.append(name)
break
return (Class.RESTRICTED if found else floor), sorted(set(found))
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Destination:
name: str
region: str
max_class: Class
zero_retention: bool
dpa_signed: bool
subprocessors_disclosed: bool
class Denied(Exception):
pass
def route(text: str, destinations: list, required_region: str = None) -> dict:
"""Pick the first destination whose ATTESTED properties cover the data.
Order matters: destinations are supplied in preference order (cheapest or
fastest first) and the gate takes the first one that is lawful, so cost
optimisation can never override a control.
"""
level, evidence = classify(text)
reasons = []
for d in destinations:
if d.max_class < level:
reasons.append(f"{d.name}: max_class {d.max_class.name} < {level.name}")
continue
if required_region and d.region != required_region:
reasons.append(f"{d.name}: region {d.region} != {required_region}")
continue
if level >= Class.RESTRICTED and not d.zero_retention:
reasons.append(f"{d.name}: retains prompts, unusable for {level.name}")
continue
if level >= Class.CONFIDENTIAL and not d.dpa_signed:
reasons.append(f"{d.name}: no DPA on file")
continue
if level >= Class.RESTRICTED and not d.subprocessors_disclosed:
reasons.append(f"{d.name}: subprocessors undisclosed")
continue
return {"allowed": True, "destination": d.name,
"classification": level.name, "evidence": evidence,
"rejected": reasons}
raise Denied(f"no lawful destination for {level.name} data: {reasons}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
dests = [
Destination("shared-us", "us-east-1", Class.INTERNAL, False, True, False),
Destination("eu-pooled", "eu-west-1", Class.CONFIDENTIAL, False, True, True),
Destination("eu-dedicated", "eu-west-1", Class.RESTRICTED, True, True, True),
]
print(route("Summarise this quarter's churn drivers.", dests))
print(route("Patient MRN 4471902 reports side effects.", dests,
required_region="eu-west-1"))
try:
route("Card 4111111111111111 was declined.",
[d for d in dests if not d.zero_retention])
except Denied as e:
print("correctly denied:", str(e)[:96])
The GDPR control, as code
Article 17 erasure propagated into derived artifacts. This is the artifact an assessor asks for under GDPR specifically — it is not the same control as the one above, and a system that implements one does not thereby implement the other. It executes under the same publish gate.
"""Article 17 erasure that propagates into derived artifacts.
The erasure request everyone implements is a DELETE on the source row. The one
that fails an audit is the derived copy: embeddings in a vector index, a cached
retrieval chunk, a fine-tuning corpus, a prompt log. Article 17(2) expects
controllers to take reasonable steps to inform processors of the erasure, and a
vector built from personal data is still personal data.
So erasure is modelled as a lineage walk with a receipt per derived artifact,
and the request is not complete until every downstream store confirms.
"""
from datetime import datetime, timezone
class Store:
def __init__(self, name: str, kind: str):
self.name, self.kind = name, kind
self.rows: dict[str, dict] = {}
self.erased: list[str] = []
def put(self, key: str, subject_id: str, payload: str) -> None:
self.rows[key] = {"subject_id": subject_id, "payload": payload}
def erase_subject(self, subject_id: str) -> int:
doomed = [k for k, v in self.rows.items() if v["subject_id"] == subject_id]
for k in doomed:
del self.rows[k]
self.erased.append(k)
return len(doomed)
def holds(self, subject_id: str) -> int:
return sum(1 for v in self.rows.values() if v["subject_id"] == subject_id)
class ErasureOrchestrator:
"""Lineage-aware erasure. A store that is not registered cannot be erased,
so registration is the control — an unregistered derived store is exactly
how personal data survives a 'completed' erasure."""
def __init__(self):
self.stores: list[Store] = []
self.lineage: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
def register(self, store: Store, derived_from: str | None = None) -> Store:
self.stores.append(store)
if derived_from:
self.lineage.setdefault(derived_from, []).append(store.name)
return store
def execute(self, subject_id: str) -> dict:
receipts = []
for store in self.stores:
held = store.holds(subject_id)
removed = store.erase_subject(subject_id)
receipts.append({"store": store.name, "kind": store.kind,
"held": held, "erased": removed})
residual = {s.name: s.holds(subject_id) for s in self.stores
if s.holds(subject_id)}
return {
"subject_id": subject_id,
"completed_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(timespec="seconds"),
"receipts": receipts,
"residual": residual,
"complete": not residual,
"derived_stores_covered": sorted(
s.name for s in self.stores if s.kind != "source"),
}
if __name__ == "__main__":
orch = ErasureOrchestrator()
src = orch.register(Store("crm_postgres", "source"))
vec = orch.register(Store("vector_index", "embedding"), derived_from="crm_postgres")
cache = orch.register(Store("retrieval_cache", "cache"), derived_from="vector_index")
logs = orch.register(Store("prompt_log", "log"), derived_from="crm_postgres")
src.put("c-1", "subject-77", "Jana Soor, contract renewal notes")
vec.put("v-1", "subject-77", "[0.11, -0.4, ...]")
cache.put("k-1", "subject-77", "chunk: contract renewal notes")
logs.put("l-1", "subject-77", "prompt containing the same notes")
src.put("c-2", "subject-90", "unrelated subject")
result = orch.execute("subject-77")
assert result["complete"], result["residual"]
assert len(result["derived_stores_covered"]) == 3, result
assert sum(r["erased"] for r in result["receipts"]) == 4, result
assert src.holds("subject-90") == 1, "erasure must not over-reach"
# An unregistered derived store is the failure this design exists to expose.
orphan = Store("analytics_extract", "warehouse")
orphan.put("a-1", "subject-77", "same personal data, different copy")
assert orphan.holds("subject-77") == 1
assert orphan.name not in {s.name for s in orch.stores}
print("GDPR Article 17 lineage erasure: OK")
print(f" stores erased {len(result['receipts'])}, complete={result['complete']}")
print(f" UNREGISTERED store still holding data: {orphan.name} "
f"({orphan.holds('subject-77')} row) — registration is the control")
The request path
Classification-Routed Multi-Cloud Estate — the request path, with the decision points that must exist before the first model call:
flowchart TB
IN[Request payload] --> CLS[Deterministic classifier<br/>regex + Luhn/checksum]
CLS --> LV{Classification}
LV -->|PUBLIC / INTERNAL| D1[shared-us]
LV -->|CONFIDENTIAL| D2[eu-pooled<br/>DPA required]
LV -->|RESTRICTED| D3[eu-dedicated<br/>zero-retention + subprocessors]
LV -->|no lawful destination| DN[Deny + reason]
D1 --> LOG[(Decision log)]
D2 --> LOG
D3 --> LOG
DN --> LOG
D3 --> LIN[Lineage tag on<br/>embeddings / cache / evals]
ATT[Destination attestations] -.-> LV
ATT --> DR[Drift detector]The parts you have to build
- Deterministic classifier — Pattern plus validator (Luhn, checksum) so the gate does not cry wolf.
- Destination attestations — Region, max class, retention, DPA, subprocessor disclosure — as data.
- Routing gate — First lawful destination in preference order; cost can never override a control.
- Decision log — A recorded reason for every allow AND every deny.
- Lineage tags — Classification travels with derived artifacts: embeddings, caches, evals.
- Drift detector — Alerts when a destination's attested properties change.
Risk register with acceptance criteria
Each row carries an acceptance parameter rather than an adjective, because "low latency" cannot be signed off. Retention here is bound by per the data class retention schedule, enforced automatically.
| Category | Risk | Control | Acceptance parameter |
|---|---|---|---|
| GDPR | Erasure request cannot reach data derived into embeddings or caches | Tag every derived artifact with the source record id; make erasure a graph traversal, not a row delete | Erasure completes across all derived stores within 30 days, evidenced by a lineage report per request |
| Data privacy | Restricted data routed to a provider that retains prompts | Attested zero-retention required for RESTRICTED; gate fails closed with a reason | 0 RESTRICTED requests to retaining destinations; every deny carries a reason |
| Data privacy | Classification lost on derived artifacts (embeddings, caches) | Propagate the classification tag into every derived store and enforce it on read | Lineage audit: 100% of embedding records carry a classification tag |
| Data privacy | Detector false positives train staff to bypass the gate | Validate candidates (Luhn, checksum, format) before escalating classification | False-positive rate under 2% on a labelled sample; reviewed monthly |
| Latency SLA | Classification added to every request path | Compiled patterns, bounded input scan, no network call in the gate | Classifier p95 under 3ms for payloads up to 32KB |
| Cost control | Everything routed to the most expensive compliant destination | Preference-ordered destinations; cheapest lawful option wins | Share of traffic on dedicated capacity tracked; only RESTRICTED lands there |
| Operational | A destination's properties change without anyone noticing | Attestations are versioned data; drift detector alerts on change | Attestation drift alert within 24h; routing re-evaluated on change |
| Operational | Region requirement satisfied at the gateway but not at the provider | Pin provider endpoint per region and assert the served region in the response | Region assertion failure rate 0; mismatches fail the request |
Questions to answer before approval
- A data subject requests erasure. Trace exactly what gets deleted, including embeddings and cached completions.
Every derived artifact carries the source record id, so erasure traverses the lineage graph. The completion report lists each store touched and the rows removed. - What function decides which destination may see RESTRICTED data, and where does it run?
The routing gate, evaluated before egress. It is a deterministic function of the data's classification and the destination's attested properties, and it fails closed when no destination is lawful. - Show me the recorded reason for a denial last week.
Every allow and every deny is written to the decision log with the reason — which destinations were rejected and on which property — so a denial is explainable months later. - When a document is embedded, does the embedding carry its classification — and is that enforced on read?
Yes. The classification tag propagates into every derived store, including embeddings, caches and eval sets, and is enforced on read as well as write. - What happens when a provider adds a subprocessor you have not disclosed?
The drift detector alerts when a destination's attested properties change, and routing is re-evaluated against the new attestation. Attestations are versioned data, not a one-off questionnaire. - How do you prove processing stayed in the contracted region?
The provider endpoint is pinned per region and the served region is asserted on the response; a mismatch fails the request rather than completing it quietly.
Adjacent problems
- Part of enterprise ai data governance.
- A different failure mode of the same component: fedRAMP Moderate data governance framework for enterprise LLM deployment.
- The same control appears in SOX data governance framework for enterprise LLM deployment.
- The same control appears in PCI DSS 4.0 data governance framework for enterprise LLM deployment.
- ISO/IEC 27001:2022 data governance framework for enterprise LLM deployment applies the same mechanism under a different obligation.
- If this is the blocker in front of you: enterprise AI infrastructure review.
Enterprise infrastructure review
If you are carrying this blocker, the useful next step is not a demo. It is a review of your actual request path against the control points above:
- Which of the 6 components exist in your estate today, and which are assumed
- Your current numbers against the 7 acceptance parameters, starting with p95 ≤ 600ms
- Which GDPR control questions you cannot yet answer, and what closes each gap