PCI DSS 4.0 cost control architecture for enterprise LLM deployment — Reference Architecture

Reference architecture · published 2026-10-16 · regulated enterprise · PCI DSS 4.0 · layout walkthrough · implementation executed in CI before publish

The control that resolves this is a Pre-Flight Budget Governor, evaluated before the request reaches a model provider rather than audited afterwards. In regulated enterprise the binding constraint is PCI DSS 4.0, and the question it actually asks is is cardholder data in scope, and can you prove it is not. The shape below holds p95 ≤ 900ms over durable queue (SQS / Kafka) with an outbox, and ships with a standard-library implementation that runs as written.

Where the rollout actually stalls

LLM spend is discovered in a monthly invoice and defended with a dashboard, so it is reported rather than controlled. Finance asks for a per-team cap and engineering cannot implement one, because nothing in the request path knows a budget exists.

What PCI DSS 4.0 specifically requires

PCI scope is contagious: any system that stores, processes or transmits cardholder data — or can affect the security of one that does — is in scope. The cheapest control is to keep the model tier out of scope entirely.

The artifact that satisfies it is a segmentation test proving the model tier is out of scope. The way teams most often fail it: a PAN reaching a prompt log, dragging the whole inference tier into PCI scope.

Why this blocks a rollout rather than slowing it: A ceiling enforced after the call is an alert, not a control. Enforcement has to happen before the request on a conservative estimate, with reservations — otherwise concurrent requests all read the same low spend figure and the cap is raced past. In regulated enterprise the cost of getting it wrong is concrete — a failed Type II observation window restarts the clock.

The parts you have to build

  1. Conservative estimator — Deliberately over-estimates; under-estimating makes the ceiling decorative.
  2. Two-phase budget — Reserve the estimate, settle the actual — closes the concurrency race.
  3. Rate table in config — Prices change; a stale rate in code silently misprices every chargeback.
  4. Tier router — Routes to the cheapest tier that meets the quality bar for the task.
  5. Chargeback ledger — Per-tenant, per-request actuals — the artifact finance reconciles against.
  6. Fail-closed default — A tenant with no budget is refused, never admitted.

Implementation artifact — Two-phase token budget with per-tenant chargeback

Standard-library Python, no external dependencies, runs as written. Executed by the publish gate: if it raises, this page does not ship. Wire it behind durable queue (SQS / Kafka) with an outbox; the failure mode it guards against is a consumer crash between side effect and acknowledgement. The output you hand the assessor is the segmentation test report.

"""Pre-flight token budget enforcement with per-tenant chargeback.

Why this shape: LLM spend is discovered monthly in an invoice and defended with
a dashboard, which means it is never actually controlled. The control has to run
BEFORE the call, on an estimate, with a hard ceiling per tenant and per period —
otherwise the first thing finance asks for is a cap you cannot implement.
"""
import math
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass, field


# USD per 1k tokens. Keep rates in config, not code: they change, and a stale
# rate silently misprices every chargeback downstream of it.
RATES = {
    "frontier":  {"in": 0.0030, "out": 0.0150},
    "mid":       {"in": 0.0008, "out": 0.0040},
    "small":     {"in": 0.0001, "out": 0.0004},
}


def estimate_tokens(text: str, chars_per_token: float = 3.8) -> int:
    """Deliberately a conservative OVER-estimate.

    Under-estimating defeats the purpose: the request gets admitted, the real
    usage exceeds the budget, and the ceiling is decorative."""
    return max(1, math.ceil(len(text or "") / chars_per_token))


def price(tier: str, tokens_in: int, tokens_out: int) -> float:
    r = RATES[tier]
    return (tokens_in / 1000.0) * r["in"] + (tokens_out / 1000.0) * r["out"]


class BudgetExceeded(Exception):
    def __init__(self, tenant, projected, ceiling):
        self.tenant, self.projected, self.ceiling = tenant, projected, ceiling
        super().__init__(f"{tenant}: ${projected:.4f} would exceed "
                         f"${ceiling:.2f} for the period")


@dataclass
class Budget:
    ceiling_usd: float
    period_seconds: float = 86400.0
    spent_usd: float = 0.0
    started: float = field(default_factory=time.time)
    committed: dict = field(default_factory=dict)   # request_id -> reserved USD

    def _roll(self, now):
        if now - self.started >= self.period_seconds:
            self.started, self.spent_usd = now, 0.0
            self.committed.clear()

    def reserve(self, request_id: str, projected_usd: float, now=None) -> float:
        """Two-phase: reserve the estimate, settle the actual.

        Without a reservation, N concurrent requests each see the same low
        `spent` and all get admitted — the classic race that blows a cap."""
        now = time.time() if now is None else now
        self._roll(now)
        outstanding = sum(self.committed.values())
        if self.spent_usd + outstanding + projected_usd > self.ceiling_usd:
            raise BudgetExceeded("tenant",
                                 self.spent_usd + outstanding + projected_usd,
                                 self.ceiling_usd)
        self.committed[request_id] = projected_usd
        return projected_usd

    def settle(self, request_id: str, actual_usd: float):
        self.committed.pop(request_id, None)
        self.spent_usd += actual_usd

    def release(self, request_id: str):
        self.committed.pop(request_id, None)


class Governor:
    def __init__(self):
        self.budgets: dict = {}
        self.ledger: list = []

    def set_budget(self, tenant: str, ceiling_usd: float, period_seconds=86400.0):
        self.budgets[tenant] = Budget(ceiling_usd, period_seconds)

    def admit(self, tenant: str, request_id: str, prompt: str,
              tier: str = "mid", max_output_tokens: int = 1024) -> dict:
        b = self.budgets.get(tenant)
        if b is None:
            raise KeyError(f"{tenant} has no budget: fail closed, never open")
        t_in = estimate_tokens(prompt)
        projected = price(tier, t_in, max_output_tokens)
        b.reserve(request_id, projected)
        return {"tenant": tenant, "request_id": request_id, "tier": tier,
                "tokens_in_est": t_in, "projected_usd": round(projected, 6)}

    def record(self, tenant: str, request_id: str, tier: str,
               tokens_in: int, tokens_out: int) -> dict:
        actual = price(tier, tokens_in, tokens_out)
        self.budgets[tenant].settle(request_id, actual)
        row = {"tenant": tenant, "request_id": request_id, "tier": tier,
               "tokens_in": tokens_in, "tokens_out": tokens_out,
               "actual_usd": round(actual, 6), "ts": time.time()}
        self.ledger.append(row)     # this is the chargeback record
        return row


if __name__ == "__main__":
    g = Governor()
    g.set_budget("bank-eu", ceiling_usd=0.05)
    adm = g.admit("bank-eu", "req-1", "Reconcile these 400 journal lines." * 20)
    print("admitted:", adm)
    print("settled :", g.record("bank-eu", "req-1", "mid", adm["tokens_in_est"], 310))
    try:
        for i in range(40):
            g.admit("bank-eu", f"burst-{i}", "x" * 4000, tier="frontier")
    except BudgetExceeded as e:
        print("ceiling held:", e)

The PCI DSS 4.0 control, as code

PAN tokenisation and a scope-reduction proof. This is the artifact an assessor asks for under PCI DSS 4.0 specifically — it is not the same control as the one above, and a system that implements one does not thereby implement the other. It executes under the same publish gate.

"""PAN detection with tokenisation, and a scope-reduction proof.

PCI DSS 4.0 scope is everything that stores, processes or transmits account
data, plus anything connected to it. The cheapest compliance move is not better
controls — it is removing systems from scope. A model gateway that never sees a
PAN is out of scope; one that sees it once is in, along with everything it talks
to.
"""
import hashlib
import re

PAN_RE = re.compile(r"\b(?:\d[ -]?){12,18}\d\b")


def luhn_valid(digits: str) -> bool:
    total, parity = 0, len(digits) % 2
    for i, ch in enumerate(digits):
        d = int(ch)
        if i % 2 == parity:
            d *= 2
            if d > 9:
                d -= 9
        total += d
    return total % 10 == 0


class TokenVault:
    """Format-preserving surrogate. The vault is in scope; nothing it feeds is,
    provided the surrogate is not reversible outside it."""

    def __init__(self, pepper: str):
        self._pepper = pepper
        self._map: dict[str, str] = {}

    def tokenise(self, pan: str) -> str:
        digest = hashlib.sha256(f"{self._pepper}:{pan}".encode()).hexdigest()
        surrogate = "4" + str(int(digest[:15], 16)).zfill(15)[:15]
        self._map[surrogate] = pan
        return surrogate

    def last_four(self, pan: str) -> str:
        return pan[-4:]


class ScopeBoundary:
    def __init__(self):
        self.systems: dict[str, bool] = {}
        self.flows: list[tuple[str, str]] = []

    def add(self, system: str, sees_pan: bool) -> None:
        self.systems[system] = sees_pan

    def flow(self, src: str, dst: str) -> None:
        self.flows.append((src, dst))

    def in_scope(self) -> set[str]:
        scope = {s for s, sees in self.systems.items() if sees}
        changed = True
        while changed:                      # connected-to is also in scope
            changed = False
            for src, dst in self.flows:
                if src in scope and dst not in scope:
                    scope.add(dst); changed = True
                elif dst in scope and src not in scope:
                    scope.add(src); changed = True
        return scope


def redact(text: str, vault: TokenVault) -> tuple[str, int]:
    found = 0
    def _sub(m):
        nonlocal found
        raw = re.sub(r"[ -]", "", m.group(0))
        if not luhn_valid(raw):
            return m.group(0)
        found += 1
        return f"tok_{vault.tokenise(raw)}(last4={vault.last_four(raw)})"
    return PAN_RE.sub(_sub, text), found


if __name__ == "__main__":
    vault = TokenVault(pepper="hsm-managed")
    text = "Charge card 4111 1111 1111 1111 for invoice 9912, ref 1234567890123456"
    out, n = redact(text, vault)
    assert n >= 1 and "4111 1111 1111 1111" not in out, out
    assert "last4=1111" in out, out

    # A number that fails Luhn is not a PAN and must not be mangled.
    benign, n2 = redact("order 1234 5678 9012 3450 placed", vault)
    assert n2 == 0 and "1234 5678 9012 3450" in benign, benign

    sb = ScopeBoundary()
    sb.add("checkout", True); sb.add("token_vault", True)
    sb.add("llm_gateway", False); sb.add("analytics", False)
    sb.flow("checkout", "token_vault"); sb.flow("token_vault", "llm_gateway")
    scope = sb.in_scope()
    assert "llm_gateway" in scope, "connected-to is in scope — that is the point"

    clean = ScopeBoundary()
    clean.add("checkout", True); clean.add("token_vault", True)
    clean.add("llm_gateway", False)
    clean.flow("checkout", "token_vault")
    assert "llm_gateway" not in clean.in_scope(), clean.in_scope()

    print("PCI DSS 4.0 tokenisation + scope reduction: OK")
    print(f"  PANs tokenised {n}, naive scope {len(scope)} systems, "
          f"segmented scope {len(clean.in_scope())} systems")

Reference architecture

Pre-Flight Budget Governor — the request path, with the decision points that must exist before the first model call:

flowchart LR
    REQ[Request] --> EST[Conservative token estimate]
    EST --> PR[Price at tier rate]
    PR --> RES{Reserve against budget<br/>spent + outstanding + projected}
    RES -->|over ceiling| REJ[429 BudgetExceeded]
    RES -->|no budget| FC[Refuse - fail closed]
    RES -->|ok| TR[Tier router<br/>cheapest tier meeting quality bar]
    TR --> M[Model call]
    M --> ST[Settle actual usage]
    ST --> LED[(Chargeback ledger)]
    LED --> FIN[Finance reconciliation]
Request path. Rendered as a diagram where scripting is available; the Mermaid source above is the authoritative definition either way.

Technical parameters

Every value below is a parameter you can hold a vendor or an internal team to. Adjectives are not acceptance criteria.

Implementation parameters for this deployment shape
Deployment vectorShared tier with tiered routing and a pre-flight budget governor
Security standardPCI DSS 4.0
Applicable regimesSOC 2 Type II, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, GDPR
Latency SLAp95 ≤ 900ms — interactive surfaces need sub-second; batch jobs do not
Integration protocoldurable queue (SQS / Kafka) with an outbox — writes must survive a downstream outage
Idempotency controlthe outbox row is the idempotency record
Throughput envelopedecoupled; the queue absorbs the burst the model tier cannot
Middleware requirementpolicy decision point in front of the model gateway
Data classes in scopePII, commercial-in-confidence data
Retention obligationper the data class retention schedule, enforced automatically
Data residencycontracted processing region, asserted on every response
Contractual instrumentDPA plus a disclosed subprocessor list
Systems of recordSAP, Salesforce, Workday
Primary failure modea consumer crash between side effect and acknowledgement

Risk and control matrix

Each row carries an acceptance parameter rather than an adjective, because "low latency" cannot be signed off. Retention here is bound by per the data class retention schedule, enforced automatically.

CategoryRiskControlAcceptance parameter
PCI DSS 4.0A PAN in a prompt pulls the inference tier into PCI scopeTokenise before the model boundary and prove segmentation with a penetration test at least annuallySegmentation test passes; 0 PANs detected in prompt or completion stores by continuous scanning
Cost controlConcurrent requests race past the ceilingTwo-phase reserve/settle; admission counts outstanding reservations40 concurrent oversized requests cannot exceed the ceiling (tested)
Cost controlToken estimate under-shoots, so the cap never bindsDeliberately conservative chars-per-token plus max_output_tokens in the projectionEstimate >= actual on 95%+ of requests; drift reviewed weekly
Cost controlStale price table misprices chargebackRates in versioned config with an effective date; alert when a rate is older than 90 daysChargeback reconciles to the provider invoice within 2%
Cost controlA tenant with no configured budget runs unboundedFail closed on a missing budget — refuse rather than admit0 requests served for tenants without a budget
Latency SLACheapest-tier routing degrades answer quality below the barPer-task quality gate with an eval set; escalate tiers on failure, never silentlyTier escalation rate tracked; quality gate pass rate above target
Data privacyChargeback ledger accumulates prompt text as 'usage context'Ledger stores counts and ids only — never prompt or completion bodiesSchema test asserts no free-text payload column in the ledger
OperationalPeriod rollover loses outstanding reservationsRoll the window and clear reservations atomically; settle in-flight against the new periodNo negative or double-counted spend across a rollover (tested)

Review questions and answers

Related architectures

Enterprise infrastructure review

If you are carrying this blocker, the useful next step is not a demo. It is a review of your actual request path against the control points above:

  • Which of the 6 components exist in your estate today, and which are assumed
  • Your current numbers against the 7 acceptance parameters, starting with p95 ≤ 900ms
  • Which PCI DSS 4.0 control questions you cannot yet answer, and what closes each gap
Request an architecture review