GDPR retrieval architecture with citation integrity for enterprise LLM deployment — Reference Architecture
The control that resolves this is a Query-Time ACL Retrieval with Citation Integrity, evaluated before the request reaches a model provider rather than audited afterwards. In regulated enterprise the binding constraint is GDPR, and the question it actually asks is what is the lawful basis, and can you actually erase. The shape below holds p95 ≤ 600ms over REST over HTTPS, and ships with a standard-library implementation that runs as written.
Reference architecture
Query-Time ACL Retrieval with Citation Integrity — the request path, with the decision points that must exist before the first model call:
flowchart LR
Q[Query + live entitlements] --> SRCH[Search index]
SRCH --> ACL{ACL match at query time?}
ACL -->|no| DROP[Drop silently from results]
ACL -->|yes| SUP{Superseded?}
SUP -->|yes| DROP
SUP -->|no| FRESH[Attach version + staleness]
FRESH --> ANS[Answer + citations]
ANS --> VER{Cited doc contains the claim?}
VER -->|no| STRIP[Refuse the citation]
VER -->|yes| OUT[Answer with verified citations]The parts you have to build
- Query-time ACL — Entitlements evaluated per query against live rights, never baked in.
- Supersession links — A replaced document is unreachable, not merely lower-ranked.
- Freshness SLO — Index age per document, with staleness reported on the hit.
- Citation containment — A cited document must contain a claim-bearing span of the answer.
- Provenance on the hit — Document id and version travel with the retrieved text.
- Revocation path — An entitlement change takes effect without a reindex.
Implementation parameter matrix
Every value below is a parameter you can hold a vendor or an internal team to. Adjectives are not acceptance criteria.
| Deployment vector | Customer-managed VPC, provider model endpoint pinned to region |
|---|---|
| Security standard | GDPR |
| Applicable regimes | SOC 2 Type II, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, GDPR |
| Latency SLA | p95 ≤ 600ms — interactive surfaces need sub-second; batch jobs do not |
| Integration protocol | REST over HTTPS — the widest compatibility and the easiest audit story |
| Idempotency control | an Idempotency-Key header, honoured for 24h |
| Throughput envelope | ~2k rps per gateway node before connection churn dominates |
| Middleware requirement | policy decision point in front of the model gateway |
| Data classes in scope | PII, commercial-in-confidence data |
| Retention obligation | per the data class retention schedule, enforced automatically |
| Data residency | contracted processing region, asserted on every response |
| Contractual instrument | DPA plus a disclosed subprocessor list |
| Systems of record | SAP, Salesforce, Workday |
| Primary failure mode | a retried POST creating a duplicate record |
The control gap
Permissions were applied when documents were indexed, the index is refreshed nightly, and citations are whatever the model names. So a revoked user still gets content, a superseded policy is quoted as current, and a citation points at a document that does not contain the claim.
What GDPR specifically requires
GDPR asks two things an audit log does not answer: under what lawful basis was this processed, and can you erase it on request. Erasure is the harder one — a prompt embedded into a vector index and a fine-tune has propagated beyond the row you deleted.
The artifact that satisfies it is a lineage graph from source record to every derived artifact. The way teams most often fail it: an erasure request that cannot be honoured because the data survives in embeddings, caches and eval sets.
Working implementation — Query-time ACL retrieval with citation containment
Standard-library Python, no external dependencies, runs as written. Executed by the publish gate: if it raises, this page does not ship. Wire it behind REST over HTTPS; the failure mode it guards against is a retried POST creating a duplicate record. The output you hand the assessor is the data-subject lineage and erasure report.
"""Retrieval with query-time ACLs, freshness SLO and citation integrity.
Three failures, one surface. Permissions applied at INDEX time go stale the
moment access changes, so a revoked user keeps seeing content through the
model. A stale index answers confidently from a superseded document. And a
citation that does not actually contain the claim is worse than no citation,
because it manufactures confidence.
"""
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
@dataclass
class Doc:
doc_id: str
text: str
version: int
indexed_at: int
acl: set = field(default_factory=set)
superseded_by: str | None = None
class Index:
def __init__(self, freshness_sue_s: int = 3600):
self.docs: dict[str, Doc] = {}
self.freshness_sue_s = freshness_sue_s
def put(self, doc: Doc) -> None:
self.docs[doc.doc_id] = doc
def stale(self, now: int) -> list[str]:
return sorted(d.doc_id for d in self.docs.values()
if now - d.indexed_at > self.freshness_sue_s)
def search(self, term: str, user_acl: set, now: int) -> list[dict]:
"""ACL is applied HERE, at query time, against live entitlements —
not baked into the index where it goes stale on the first revocation."""
hits = []
for d in self.docs.values():
if term.lower() not in d.text.lower():
continue
if d.superseded_by:
continue
if d.acl and not (d.acl & user_acl):
continue
hits.append({"doc_id": d.doc_id, "version": d.version,
"text": d.text,
"stale": now - d.indexed_at > self.freshness_sue_s})
return sorted(hits, key=lambda h: h["doc_id"])
def verify_citations(answer: str, citations: list, index: Index) -> dict:
"""A citation must contain a claim-bearing span of the answer. This is a
containment check, not a similarity score — a loose threshold here is how
plausible-but-unsupported citations get through."""
supported, unsupported = [], []
sentences = [s.strip() for s in answer.split(".") if s.strip()]
for cite in citations:
doc = index.docs.get(cite)
if not doc:
unsupported.append({"cite": cite, "reason": "cited doc not in index"})
continue
if any(s.lower() in doc.text.lower() for s in sentences):
supported.append(cite)
else:
unsupported.append({"cite": cite,
"reason": "no cited span appears in the document"})
return {"supported": supported, "unsupported": unsupported,
"trustworthy": not unsupported}
if __name__ == "__main__":
idx = Index(freshness_sue_s=3600)
idx.put(Doc("d1", "Refunds are processed within 14 days", 7,
indexed_at=0, acl={"finance"}))
idx.put(Doc("d2", "Refunds are processed within 30 days", 3,
indexed_at=0, acl={"finance"}, superseded_by="d1"))
idx.put(Doc("d3", "Public holiday schedule", 1, indexed_at=0))
# Entitlement is checked at query time.
allowed = idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"finance"}, now=10)
assert [h["doc_id"] for h in allowed] == ["d1"], allowed
denied = idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"marketing"}, now=10)
assert denied == [], denied
# Revocation takes effect immediately, with no reindex.
idx.docs["d1"].acl = {"finance-restricted"}
assert idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"finance"}, now=10) == []
# Superseded documents never surface.
assert all(h["doc_id"] != "d2" for h in
idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"finance-restricted"}, now=10))
# Staleness is reported rather than silently served as current.
assert idx.stale(now=10) == []
assert set(idx.stale(now=10_000)) == {"d1", "d2", "d3"}
hits = idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"finance-restricted"}, now=10_000)
assert hits and hits[0]["stale"] is True, hits
good = verify_citations("Refunds are processed within 14 days.", ["d1"], idx)
assert good["trustworthy"], good
bad = verify_citations("Refunds are processed within 2 days.", ["d1"], idx)
assert not bad["trustworthy"], bad
missing = verify_citations("Anything.", ["d99"], idx)
assert missing["unsupported"][0]["reason"] == "cited doc not in index"
print("Query-time ACL retrieval + citation integrity: OK")
print(f" stale docs at t=10000: {len(idx.stale(10_000))}, "
f"citation trustworthy good={good['trustworthy']} bad={bad['trustworthy']}")
The GDPR control, as code
Article 17 erasure propagated into derived artifacts. This is the artifact an assessor asks for under GDPR specifically — it is not the same control as the one above, and a system that implements one does not thereby implement the other. It executes under the same publish gate.
"""Article 17 erasure that propagates into derived artifacts.
The erasure request everyone implements is a DELETE on the source row. The one
that fails an audit is the derived copy: embeddings in a vector index, a cached
retrieval chunk, a fine-tuning corpus, a prompt log. Article 17(2) expects
controllers to take reasonable steps to inform processors of the erasure, and a
vector built from personal data is still personal data.
So erasure is modelled as a lineage walk with a receipt per derived artifact,
and the request is not complete until every downstream store confirms.
"""
from datetime import datetime, timezone
class Store:
def __init__(self, name: str, kind: str):
self.name, self.kind = name, kind
self.rows: dict[str, dict] = {}
self.erased: list[str] = []
def put(self, key: str, subject_id: str, payload: str) -> None:
self.rows[key] = {"subject_id": subject_id, "payload": payload}
def erase_subject(self, subject_id: str) -> int:
doomed = [k for k, v in self.rows.items() if v["subject_id"] == subject_id]
for k in doomed:
del self.rows[k]
self.erased.append(k)
return len(doomed)
def holds(self, subject_id: str) -> int:
return sum(1 for v in self.rows.values() if v["subject_id"] == subject_id)
class ErasureOrchestrator:
"""Lineage-aware erasure. A store that is not registered cannot be erased,
so registration is the control — an unregistered derived store is exactly
how personal data survives a 'completed' erasure."""
def __init__(self):
self.stores: list[Store] = []
self.lineage: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
def register(self, store: Store, derived_from: str | None = None) -> Store:
self.stores.append(store)
if derived_from:
self.lineage.setdefault(derived_from, []).append(store.name)
return store
def execute(self, subject_id: str) -> dict:
receipts = []
for store in self.stores:
held = store.holds(subject_id)
removed = store.erase_subject(subject_id)
receipts.append({"store": store.name, "kind": store.kind,
"held": held, "erased": removed})
residual = {s.name: s.holds(subject_id) for s in self.stores
if s.holds(subject_id)}
return {
"subject_id": subject_id,
"completed_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(timespec="seconds"),
"receipts": receipts,
"residual": residual,
"complete": not residual,
"derived_stores_covered": sorted(
s.name for s in self.stores if s.kind != "source"),
}
if __name__ == "__main__":
orch = ErasureOrchestrator()
src = orch.register(Store("crm_postgres", "source"))
vec = orch.register(Store("vector_index", "embedding"), derived_from="crm_postgres")
cache = orch.register(Store("retrieval_cache", "cache"), derived_from="vector_index")
logs = orch.register(Store("prompt_log", "log"), derived_from="crm_postgres")
src.put("c-1", "subject-77", "Jana Soor, contract renewal notes")
vec.put("v-1", "subject-77", "[0.11, -0.4, ...]")
cache.put("k-1", "subject-77", "chunk: contract renewal notes")
logs.put("l-1", "subject-77", "prompt containing the same notes")
src.put("c-2", "subject-90", "unrelated subject")
result = orch.execute("subject-77")
assert result["complete"], result["residual"]
assert len(result["derived_stores_covered"]) == 3, result
assert sum(r["erased"] for r in result["receipts"]) == 4, result
assert src.holds("subject-90") == 1, "erasure must not over-reach"
# An unregistered derived store is the failure this design exists to expose.
orphan = Store("analytics_extract", "warehouse")
orphan.put("a-1", "subject-77", "same personal data, different copy")
assert orphan.holds("subject-77") == 1
assert orphan.name not in {s.name for s in orch.stores}
print("GDPR Article 17 lineage erasure: OK")
print(f" stores erased {len(result['receipts'])}, complete={result['complete']}")
print(f" UNREGISTERED store still holding data: {orphan.name} "
f"({orphan.holds('subject-77')} row) — registration is the control")
Controls and acceptance parameters
Each row carries an acceptance parameter rather than an adjective, because "low latency" cannot be signed off. Retention here is bound by per the data class retention schedule, enforced automatically.
| Category | Risk | Control | Acceptance parameter |
|---|---|---|---|
| GDPR | Erasure request cannot reach data derived into embeddings or caches | Tag every derived artifact with the source record id; make erasure a graph traversal, not a row delete | Erasure completes across all derived stores within 30 days, evidenced by a lineage report per request |
| Data privacy | A revoked user still receives content through the model | ACL evaluated at query time against live entitlements, not at index time | Revocation effective on the next query with no reindex; tested |
| Operational | A superseded document is quoted as current policy | Supersession links make a replaced document unreachable in search | 0 superseded documents in result sets; tested |
| Operational | A stale index answers confidently from old content | Per-document index age with staleness flagged on every hit | Hits older than the freshness SLO carry a stale flag |
| Operational | A citation does not contain the claim it supports | Containment check of a claim-bearing span against the cited document | Unsupported citations refused rather than displayed |
| Data privacy | Embeddings of restricted documents leak through similarity | Restricted documents filtered before ranking, not after | No restricted document contributes to a result the user may not read |
| Cost control | Query-time ACL evaluation adds per-query cost | Entitlement sets cached per principal with a short TTL | Added cost per query measured; TTL bounded by the revocation SLO |
| Latency SLA | Filtering after ranking forces over-fetching | Filter during the scan so the candidate set is already permitted | p95 retrieval latency within budget at the required recall |
Questions to answer before approval
- A data subject requests erasure. Trace exactly what gets deleted, including embeddings and cached completions.
Every derived artifact carries the source record id, so erasure traverses the lineage graph. The completion report lists each store touched and the rows removed. - A user's access is revoked at 09:00. When does the model stop retrieving that content for them?
On their next query. Entitlements are evaluated at query time against live rights, so revocation does not wait for a reindex — which is the whole reason index-time ACLs fail. - What stops a superseded policy document being quoted as current?
Supersession links. A replaced document is unreachable in search rather than ranked lower, so it cannot surface as a near-miss when the replacement is less similar. - How do you know a citation actually supports the sentence it is attached to?
A containment check: a claim-bearing span of the answer must appear in the cited document. A citation that fails is refused, because an unsupported citation manufactures confidence. - How does a reader know whether the retrieved content is current?
Every hit carries its document version and a staleness flag derived from the freshness SLO, so content older than the agreed window is visibly old rather than silently current. - Can a restricted document influence results through similarity without being shown?
No. Restricted documents are filtered during the scan, before ranking, so they never contribute to the candidate set a user may not read.
Adjacent problems
- Part of enterprise ai compliance architecture.
- This pattern also governs GDPR data governance framework for enterprise LLM deployment.
- GDPR prompt injection defence architecture for enterprise LLM deployment covers the adjacent case.
- This pattern also governs GDPR vendor evaluation criteria for enterprise AI implementation.
- GDPR provider failover and degradation architecture for enterprise LLM covers the adjacent case.
- If this is the blocker in front of you: enterprise AI infrastructure review.
Enterprise infrastructure review
If you are carrying this blocker, the useful next step is not a demo. It is a review of your actual request path against the control points above:
- Which of the 6 components exist in your estate today, and which are assumed
- Your current numbers against the 7 acceptance parameters, starting with p95 ≤ 600ms
- Which GDPR control questions you cannot yet answer, and what closes each gap